Keep the Freeze: Military Assistance and Plan Colombia

In the beginning of April, the democratically controlled Congress froze $55.2 million in military assistance earmarked for Colombia due to questions about linkages between the Andean nation’s military and a paramilitary group on the State Department’s terrorist list. The administration response has largely been to marshal the troops and espouse the benefits of Plan Colombia the vehicle that delivers US assistance to Colombia.

Never mind that this procedural issue is largely related to an issue of corruption and human rights and, as such, the success of the program is largely irrelevant. The US government is legislatively required to certify foreign governments receiving military assistance as having a good human rights record. The Congress froze that aid because it sees the current scandal as evidence that Colombia can not meet the human rights requirements.

The rationale for prohibiting military assistance to nations with poor human rights records is simple. It does not serve US interests to materially support organizations in cahoots with foreign terrorists, even if those organizations are bosom buddies of the current administration in Washington. It would not, for example, behoove US interests to give military support to the Lebanese military if that support directly aided Hezbollah, just as it would make no sense, if the current allegations are true, to empower a Colombian military that directly contributes to internal displacement, violence, or even crimes against humanity.

Moreover, dangling military assistance can be a tool to motivate foreign nations to clean up their human rights records, assuming that tool is actually utilized. No mistake can be made about Colombia’s desire for this military assistance. By freezing the funds, Congress is making a clear foreign policy statement to Colombia that the President is unwilling to imagine: clean up the corruption in the military or forgo further assistance.

That being said, the so-called “successes” currently being trumpeted by the Bush Administration and its allies are more hogwash than compelling justification to continue military support. Take, for example, the tactic of Robert Charles, former assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement, who likened Plan Colombia to the Marshall Plan. The analogy, while poorly crafted, is just the beginning of a pleasant list of GOP talking points that those who live in Colombia only wish were true.

Consider Mr. Charles’s claim that UN and US estimates show poppy cultivation down by 58% and coca by 50%. Unfortunately, the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2007 shows that both of those numbers were temporary declines measured during the mid-years of Plan Colombia. The most recent evidence clearly shows that coca cultivation has returned to pre-Plan Colombia levels and US led eradication efforts are failing.

Or the claim that Plan Colombia has begun to change the price of cocaine on America’s streets. Change, yes, but for the worse. A recent report from the Washington Office on Latin America, citing statistics from the White House drug czar’s office, shows that cocaine prices are actually lower than ever, a clear indication that supply is at an all time high.

Mr. Charles is correct that criminal actions against drug traffickers and cocaine seizure are up, but mistakes those headlines for significant news in the war on drugs. Had those measures been terribly significant, then one would expect the overall supply of cocaine to be lower and thus prices higher. Not so. Chopping the head off the giant has only lead to the replacement of kingpins with lower level lieutenants and a flood of cocaine trafficking.

Charles also trumpets out the “official” statistics reporting significant declines in violent crime and kidnappings as evidence that Plan Colombia is working. While there is no doubt that the urban environment in Colombia’s major cities is much better than it was in 2000, it bears mentioning that the director of Colombia’s Federal Statistics Office resigned in 2004 because President Uribe blocked the release of a study showing an upsurge in violent crime. Or that the Colombian government developed new standards for classifying “kidnappings” that require specific evidence of abduction or that about half of all kidnappings are not reported. One only has to visit the US State Department’s own website to read the travel advisory for Colombia warning of a high risk of kidnapping to realize that the US government doesn’t exactly have a lot of confidence in the “official” statistics issued from the Colombian government.

But, more fundamentally, the Republican approach misunderstands the challenges that Colombia currently faces. Take Charles’s wildly optimistic statistics of the strength of the FARC. This talking point has become increasingly common among those in the administration, but it’s belied by facts on the ground. A recent UN report explained that while the FARC has been quieter in the big cities, rural actions have continued. It also characterized this “quiet” period as on of repositioning and strategizing for the future.

Charles is correct, however, that one paramilitary group has been demobilized. This fact parroted out as a great success actually highlights the crux of Colombia’s next challenge and one of the central warrants for reorienting Plan Colombia.

Recent paramilitary demobilization was based on two principles: light sentences for the leaders who cooperated with the Colombian government and temporary compensation for paramilitaries that turned in their weapons and reintegrated with civil society. The idea behind the plan was that the compensation scheme would provide adequate support for paramilitaries until they could find jobs in the legitimate economy. Unfortunately, Colombia is a country with unemployment of more than 12% and finding jobs in the legitimate economy proved difficult. The very real risk that Colombia is now facing is that former paramilitaries convert into gangsters or drug lords, filling the voids created by those extradited and prosecuted under the rubric of Plan Colombia.

Plan Colombia must be reoriented towards developing legitimate and sustainable economic opportunities for demobilized paramilitaries. This is an area that the Colombian government has had little success. While the record of US development assistance is uneven at best, reallocating resources toward rural development, small business creation and investment, infrastructure improvements, and services for the nation’s lower classes is desperately needed.

As Steinbeck wrote, “when a majority of people are hungry and cold they will take by force what they need.” If we’re really serious about reducing coca production, stopping cocaine trafficking, and ending the war in Colombia, we would be wise to heed his words and address the root cause of coca cultivation - poverty.

IT´S TIME FOR NATION-BUILDING

Since it doesn´t look like I´m going to get this published anywhere, I´m posting it here. Kind readers with connections to legitimate publishing opportunities welcome.

IT´S TIME FOR NATION-BUILDING

Since 2000, the US led “Plan Colombia” policy has utterly failed to reduce coca production in Colombia or increase the price of cocaine on the streets of America’s cities. To the contrary, cocaine prices are cheaper now than they were prior to the initiation of Plan Colombia and all indications are that coca production is up in Colombia as well.

The current U.S.-led strategy to eradicate Colombian cocaine production has two major components: eradicating coca plantations via aerial fumigation and promoting crop substitution schemes as incentives for rural farmers to end coca production. Both will continue to fail unless Washington changes this strategy considerably. As Congress considers the so-called “Plan Colombia II”, they should take note of several facts.

First, aerial fumigation has driven coca production into jungles and other hard-to-find areas throughout Colombia as well as across international borders - factors which greatly reduce the relevance and success rate of this strategy. Continued spraying would only further negatively impact legitimate plantations by poisoning groundwater and contributing to soil depletion, variables which have a greater negative impact on legitimate crops and thus, are likely to complicate future efforts to build legitimate farming opportunities.

Second, herbicide is often sprayed over legitimate plantations. This is especially troublesome as herbicides can’t discriminate between licit and illicit crops. Due to the threat of attack from the ground, planes have to release chemicals at high altitudes, making targeted plantation spraying impossible. This problem is worsening as locating large scale coca plantations like those that existed in Putamayo department in 2000 is difficult to impossible. Since this practice began in 2000, over 8,000 Colombian farmers have lost legitimate crops to overzealous fumigation, a trend likely to accelerate if crop spraying continues. The result is that legal and legitimate farmers have lost their livelihoods, increasing the likelihood that they shift to illicit crop production.

It can be concluded that while aerial fumigation can increase the difficulty of coca production, it can’t stop it.

On the other hand, crop substitution strategies, while having great potential; also suffer from a lack of vision. While these programs are staffed with legions of capable civil servants, due to safety concerns, USAID ignores large parts of the southern, most vulnerable region of the country. Moreover, it’s clear that these programs alone will not be sufficient to halt coca production as the financial returns from coca far outweigh that of yucca, potato, and corn.

Additionally, USAID has had difficulty persuading farmers to switch from illicit, yet stable income sources to licit crops which endure frequent price fluctuations. Even farmers that express the desire to grow licit crops are reluctant to give up small plots of coca as a means to stabilize their income sources.

The lack of infrastructure in rural, coca growing regions further complicates these assistance efforts. Poor roads and long, sometimes dangerous trips to markets mean that farmers have difficulty converting legitimate crops into economic gains. The absence of a comprehensive rural development strategy often means that farmers have little choice but to opt for an illicit crop that ensures a guaranteed return on investment.

There is still time to fix Plan Colombia II. The US Congress should act now to reorient the program away from the environmentally hazardous and totally failed strategy of aerial fumigation. After six years it is clear that eradication will never be sufficient to alter the very real conditions on the ground. Nor will clever crop substitution schemes be sustainable in the long run absent improved security and governmental presence in rural areas. It’s time to acknowledge that this is a question of nation building and not of simple illicit crop eradication or counterinsurgency.

Reorienting assistance in a comprehensive development strategy to strengthen rural governments and improve public services in under-developed areas is the next step. This move should include a plan that enables farmers to maintain long-term profitability. Linking legitimate crops to export markets and secondary productive chains, for example, would be a good measure. Fortunately, USAID already has the blueprint for this shift in priorities; it just requires a little Congressional will power to refocus foreign assistance toward poverty alleviation.

Equally, success will depend on Colombia stepping up to do its part. President Uribe should rethink the “Plan Patriota” strategy launched in 2004 and realize that military offensives into guerilla strongholds are less relevant than bringing security to rural communities. Traditional military offensives against insurgents, as seen in Iraq, ignore a fundamental reality of armed insurgency – insurgents don’t need to hold land like traditional, state-based military forces. History has shown that traditional war strategies against insurgency don’t achieve long-lasting results. A recent UN report backs up this prediction stating, among other things, that the FARC is reorganizing and the “lull” in violence was due to a reevaluation of strategy, rather than the effectiveness of the Plan Patriota strategy.

Unless and until the Colombian government is able to establish a strong and responsive police and civilian presence in long forgotten areas, rural farmers will continue to face a Hobbesian Choice: either grow coca at the behest of guerilla, paramilitary, or criminal forces or else. A strong governmental presence in rural areas, combined with the help of carefully crafted US assistance could make a real difference.

The left leaning activist will cringe at this characterization as it ultimately places faith in a Colombian government and police force that has a legacy of corruption evidenced by the ongoing investigation into government linkages with paramilitary groups. The right leaning realist will also cringe as the idea of providing material support to a government fighting a leftist insurgency draws up images of Vietnam-style, or more seasonably, Iraq-style entanglement.

Neither of these views, however, acknowledge the enduring reality that the traditional war on drugs is equally oblivious to – namely that the work required to combat insurgency and drug trafficking in Colombia is fundamentally a problem of poverty and a failure of government to respond to the challenges of rural under-development. What is required is a sustained and aggressive strategy designed to boost the presence and responsiveness of rural governments. Police and military forces need to protect rural areas, not just big cities. And rural development plans that make sense, including infrastructure improvements, crop substitution, and integrated development strategies, need to be implemented.

Half measures like those seen under Plan Colombia and USAID development programs provide politicians and taxpayers some emotional assurance that the entrusted authorities are doing their best to eliminate the problem. But, the appropriated funds are ultimately wasteful if they don’t address the root of the problem or attempt to confront the central challenges at hand. Shifting away from the failing military strategy to tackling the problem of poverty will create long term, sustainable results not just for the lives of Colombia’s poor, but also for US national interests.